This paper shows that the presence of security lending supply before an initial public offering (IPO) reduces the initial stock return following IPO and improves subsequent long-run performance. We use a sample of British firms that go public via a two-stage IPO procedure where a firm becomes publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange in the first stage, and offers new shares to the public in the second stage. Stocks are lendable before the new equity issuance which relaxes the short-sale constraints that investors typically face in a conventional IPO. We find that two-stage offerings with higher security lending supply before offering are associated with lower IPO underpricing and better long-run performance. Our results are consistent with the conjecture that short selling improves the pricing efficiency of the IPO market.
Introduction
In this paper we analyze the effect of relaxing short-sale constraints on the market performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) . We show that the presence of short sellers before an IPO reduces first-day IPO return and improves long-run stock performance. The average first-day IPO return has been abnormally high in the past five decades (Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter 1994) , which is often referred as the IPO underpricing puzzle. IPOs with higher first-day price run-up are associated with lower return in the long-run (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995) . Theories predict that short-sale constraints and opinion dispersion could lead to the market overvaluation of IPOs in the short-term (Miller, 1977; Derrien, 2005; and Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh, 2006) . This overpricing would revert back to the fundamental value in the long-run with the gradual relaxation of short-sale constraints. However, since the short-sale supply of stocks does not typically exist before the offering date of an IPO, the effects of short-sale constraints on IPO related issues have not been directly examined.
In this study, we examine how the relaxation of short-sale constraints before the IPO offering day affects the IPO first-day return and subsequent long-run performance. If short-sale constraints reduce the pricing efficiency of IPOs, the presence of stock lending supply would reduce the initial abnormal returns on the public offering day. Further, with the gradual relaxation of short-sale constraints, short sellers could arbitrage away the initial overpricing in the long-run, which leads to poor long-run performance after IPOs. Therefore, if short-sale supply is available before the public offering day, IPOs should experience lower initial return and better long-run performance.
Specifically, we posit that the existence of short-sale supply before the IPO offering day is likely to (i) reduce the first-day IPO return and (ii) improve the long-run performance.
To test these conjectures, we obtain a novel sample from the London Stock Exchange (LSE) on which firms could go public via a two-stage IPO strategy (i.e., introduction). An introduction, which has the same regulatory requirements as a conventional one-stage IPO, allows issuers to separate the listing (i.e., the first-stage introduction) and equity issuance (i.e., the second-stage offering) into two stages, while in the first-stage introduction, firms are listed on the LSE without raising new capital. In the second-stage offering, listed firms raise capital by issuing new shares.
Importantly, existing shares could be borrowed and sold short immediately after the first-stage introduction. When there exists a stock lending supply after the first-stage introduction, the secondstage equity issuance becomes short-sale unconstrained. Short sellers would short existing shares before the second-stage offering day if they believed stocks are overpriced, which in turn would reduce the upward price pressure on the second-stage offering day. Consequently, among twostage IPO firms, firms with higher security lending supply are expected to have less price run-up on the second-stage offering day and better performance in the long-run.
We start by examining whether relaxing short-sale constraints before IPOs reduces the initial return on the public offering day. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that two-stage IPO firms with higher security lending supply before the second-stage offering day experience lower initial price run-up. This evidence is also consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) who show that short-sale constraints could reduce the adjustment speed of price to negative information.
In addition, the existing literature suggests that underwriters would intentionally underprice IPOs, which in turn could generate higher initial return (Rock, 1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) .
However, we find that the effects of short-sale constraints on the first-day IPO return could not be explained by the pricing discount offered by underwriters.
Next, we examine the effects of short-sale constraints on IPO long-run performance.
Consistent with our expectation, we find a positive relation between the level of lending supply before the second-stage offering and the subsequent long-run stock performance. This evidence supports Miller (1977) , who conjectures that short-sale constraints on the IPO offering day could contribute to the subsequent long-run underperformance. Our findings are also in line with Derrien (2005) , Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist (2006) , and Dorn (2009) who show that the overvaluation of IPOs in the short-run could be associated with subsequent underperformance in the long-run.
Our findings contribute to three different strands of finance literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines short selling before IPOs. 1 Theoretical studies predict that short-sale constraints and opinion dispersion on the IPO offering day could be associated with the initial price run-up and subsequent long-run underperformance (e.g., Miller, 1977) . However, in conventional IPOs, short-sale supply is unobservable since data on stock lending supply are only available for publicly listed stocks. 2 Edwards and Hanley (2010) challenge this assumption by looking at the IPO first-day short interest. They find that short-sale is prevalent 1 There are some papers that examine the pre-IPO (i.e., grey) market (e.g., Dorn, 2009; Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper, 2006; and Cornelli, Goldreich, and Ljungqvist, 2006) . However, in the grey market, security lending supply does not exist and retail investors are restricted from selling short (Dorn, 2009) . Therefore, existing studies on grey market still assume that short-sale constraints exist in the grey market as well as the early IPO aftermarket.
2 Previous studies mainly focus on testing the effects of opinion dispersion on IPO related puzzles and simply take and support the assumption of short-sale constraints in the IPO aftermarket (Geczy, Musto, and Reed, 2002; Ofek and Richardson, 2003; and Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, and Yan, 2001) . Their empirical opinion dispersion measures have significant explanatory power for both the short-term IPO overpricing and subsequent long-term underperformance. on the offering day and is positively correlated with first day return. However, determined by both short-sale supply and demand, short interest does not directly measure short-sale constraints. Using a novel sample with pre-IPO short-sale supply data, we directly test the effects of short-sale constraints and find supporting evidence.
Second, we show that relaxing short-sale constraints improves pricing efficiency (e.g., Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2010; Boehmer and Wu, 2013) in a new economic setting. Existing short selling literature mainly focuses on the effects of short-selling bans to examine this relation (e.g., Autore, Billingsley and Kovacs, 2011; Beber and Pagano, 2013) . We provide new evidence to support this prediction from the IPO market.
Third, we add to the literature on the benefits of the two-stage IPO strategy and provide a new motivation behind this strategy. Derrien and Kecskés (2007) show that a two-stage IPO strategy is more effective and efficient than a conventional IPO. We further show that a two-stage IPO strategy would reduce short-run overpricing and improve the long-run performance of the newly listed firm, since short-sale constraints could be relaxed. These benefits would be valuable for practitioners and market designers.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional features of the two-stage IPO strategy. In Section 3, we develop our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our sample selection process and summary statistics. Section 5 presents our methods and empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional features of a two-stage IPO
At the London Stock Exchange, issuers could choose to go public through a conventional IPO process or via an introduction. For a conventional IPO, issuers become listed and raise capital simultaneously. The nominated broker would be responsible for pricing and promoting the newly issued shares. Meanwhile, for an introduction, issuers are listed without raising capital in the firststage introduction. Current shareholders could trade with investors who wish to buy the existing shares, but no new shares are issued at this stage. Further, with a first-stage introduction, issuers could gain access to more institutional investors by increasing their visibility.
After the first-stage introduction, many firms continue with a second-stage offering to raise new capital. The regulatory requirements for the second-stage offering are minimal. In particular, issuers only need to file a prospectus containing updated introduction prospectus, previously disclosed information and terms of the current offering if the additional offering is sold to a large number of investors. Therefore, firms with a two-stage IPO strategy could time the market more effectively than those with a conventional IPO. Following Derrien and Kecskés (2007), we define firms that get listed through a first-stage introduction and complete their second-stage offering within five years as two-stage IPO firms.
The two-stage IPO strategy provides an ideal setting to investigate the effect of short-sale constraints on IPO-related issues. This strategy is highly comparable to a conventional IPO but substantially different from a seasoned equity offering (SEO). 3 Further, for two-stage IPO firms, the market developed for existing shares at the first-stage introduction also helps to reduce the uncertainty for the second-stage new issuance (Derrien and Kecskés, 2007) . 3 The main difference between the second-stage offering and a SEO is whether the firm has conducted public issuance before. Further, Derrien and Kecskés (2007) find that the offering time, market reaction, offering day trading volume, and price run-up before the second-stage offering for two-stage firms are highly comparable to conventional IPOs, but significantly different from SEOs.
Hypotheses development
Our first hypothesis focuses on the effects of short-sale constraints on the first-day IPO return.
The positive abnormal return on the first trading day following an IPO has attracted interests among scholars over the past decades (e.g., Ibbotson, 1975; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; and Loughran and Ritter, 2004) . However, the reason for "money on the table" remains inconclusive. Miller (1977) and Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) suggest that heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale constraints could help to explain the large first-day IPO return.
Further, the short selling literature shows that short-sale constraints could lead to pricing inefficiency. For example, Autore, Billingsley and Kovacs (2011) and Beber and Pagano (2013) show that the 2008 short-sale ban reduces the stock pricing efficiency. Similarly, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010) find that stocks with limited lending supply experience lower pricing efficiency.
Therefore, if the large IPO initial return is caused by short-sale constraints, the existence of short-sale supply before the public offering day should improve the pricing efficiency and reduce the IPO initial return. We posit that among two-stage IPO firms, those with higher security lending supply before the second-stage offering would experience less market overvaluation on the offering day. To summarize, our first hypothesis states: H1: Security lending supply before the second-stage offering has a negative effect on the IPO initial return on the offering day.
Our second hypothesis examines the effects of short-sale constraints on the subsequent longrun performance of IPOs. If the price run-up on the IPO first trading day arises from the market overpricing, the stock price should gradually reverse back to its intrinsic value. Previous studies find that firms with a higher first-day IPO return are likely to be associated with poorer subsequent long-run performance (Stern and Bornstein, 1985; Ritter, 1991; and Loughran and Ritter, 1995) . Miller (1977) posits that the gradual relaxation of short-sale constraints would allow short sellers to arbitrage away the initial overpricing in the long-run. 4 Therefore, among two-stage IPO firms, those with higher security lending supply before the second-stage offering should have a better long-run performance. To summarize, our second hypothesis posits:
H2: Security lending supply before the second-stage offering has a positive effect on IPO long-run performance.
Data and summary statistics
To test these two hypotheses, we collect data from various sources. In this section, we describe the data sets and present the summary statistics.
Data sources
We hand collect the introduction information from the LSE new issue data, which are available from 1994. The LSE data provide the following information: date of first-stage introduction, company name, industry classification, and the name of the nominated broker. Since the security lending data are available from January 2002, we consider only introductions that have completed the second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. 5 For each introduction, we hand collect press releases from Factiva. We consider the earliest issuance of primary shares as 4 There are other explanations for the IPO long-run underperformance, for example, institutional ownership (Brav and Gompers, 1997), underwriter reputation (Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998)), and earnings management (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998) . However, our main focus in this paper is to examine the effects of relaxing short-sale constraints on IPO long-run performance. 5 Following Derrien and Kecskés (2007), we manually check, and if necessary exclude, introductions with initial returns less than 50% or greater than 400%. We also exclude introductions with second-stage offering day market price less than 1. the second-stage offering, and use the earliest date of news release about this issuance as the second-stage offering announcement day. Importantly, since we examine the role of short-sale constraints on the IPO performances using only two-stage IPO firms, our results are not subject to the potential issue that firms self-select into a two-stage IPO strategy.
We obtain unadjusted closing, bid, and ask prices, trading volume, and shares outstanding from Datastream, net income, operating income and sales data from Datastream and Compustat Global, prospectuses and annual reports from Thomson One Banker and Worldscope. Further, we use Factiva as a supplementary data source if prospectuses and annual reports are missing. Following Derrien and Kecskés (2007), we use the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) index as the market index and obtain the index daily closing price from Datastream.
We use the method in Derrien and Kecskés (2007) to select our sample. First, we match introduction firms with Datastream using company name and listing date. We only keep firms with relevant Datastream information. Next, we eliminate cross-listing stocks, firms that have been traded somewhere else in the world before the introduction, investment trusts and funds, and pure introductions (i.e., firms that were listed at the first-stage introduction but did not complete the second-stage offering within five years after listing). We end up with a sample of 102 introductions.
We obtain security lending supply and number of brokers from Markit, a leading provider of securities borrowing and lending data. The Markit Securities Finance Data are collected from beneficial owners, lending agents, prime brokers and institutional investors, and are available at daily frequency. Markit covers security lending data for more than 20,000 institutional funds for over ten years of history, which accounts for approximately 85% of the global security lending market.
We use the total lendable shares as our proxy for the security lending supply. Specifically, we define security lending supply as the average total shares available for lending over the previous one week ending the second-stage offering day, divided by total outstanding shares on the secondstage offering day. 6 Among the 102 introductions, 24% have positive security lending supply before the second-stage offering. The average security lending supply before second-stage offering is 12.9% for short-sale unconstrained firms (i.e., firms with positive security lending supply before second-stage offering). Table 1 presents the year distributions of the 102 introductions. Columns (1) and (2) (3) and (4). Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the 102 introductions. We winsorize variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentile to mitigate the effects of outliers. Compared to short-sale constrained firms as reported in Column (2), unconstrained issuers in Column (3) tend to have larger market capitalization, higher proceeds, and higher turnover at the first-stage introduction. Following Derrien and Kecskés (2007), we define pricing discount as the market price one day before the announcement day of the second-stage offering divided by the offering price, minus one. The 6 Our results remain similar if we define security lending supply as the average total shares available for lending over the previous one month ending the second-stage offering day divided by total outstanding shares on the second-stage offering day. average pricing discount for our sample is 18.88%, while there is no significant difference between introductions with and without security lending supply before the second-stage offering.
Summary statistics

Empirical results
Univariate analyses
To assess the relation between short-sale constraints and first-day IPO return, we first perform univariate tests. We employ two measures to evaluated the second-stage offering day price run-up,
(1) initial return, which is the market closing price on the second-stage offering day over the offering price, minus one, (2) market-adjusted initial return, which is the difference between initial return and the market return on the second-stage offering day. If short-sale constraints before the second-stage offering lead to the market overpricing, we expect short-sale unconstrained introductions to have a lower initial return. Table 3 presents the univariate test. Consistent with our expectation, the average initial return of introductions with security lending supply before the second-stage offering (14.7%) is lower than that of introductions without security lending supply (24.9%), significant at 10% level. The results remain similar with the market-adjusted initial return. This evidence suggests that the relaxation of short-sale constraints could be associated with less initial overpricing.
To evaluate the long-run performance of introductions, we employ annualized market-adjusted three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (market-adjusted-BHAR) and characteristic-adjusted three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (characteristic-adjusted-BHAR). Specifically, marketadjusted-(characteristic-adjusted-) BHAR uses the market index (size and book-to-market matched firms) as the benchmark.
Further, we also perform calendar-time portfolio and report the annualized four-factor alpha (Carhart, 1997) . Specifically, for each day, we compute the intercept of daily regression based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model for each stock that had its first-stage introduction in the last three years. We then estimate equally weighted average abnormal return for portfolios based on the full sample for introductions with and without security lending supply before the second-stage offering, separately. We rebalance each portfolio every day from the 1 st March 2005, when the first short-sale unconstrained introduction in our sample had its first-stage introduction, to the end of our sample, i.e., the 31 st October 2014. The return difference is then estimated by employing a strategy that longs the portfolio of introductions with security lending supply before second-stage offering, and short the portfolio of introductions without the security lending supply.
Consistent with our prediction, we find that introductions with security lending supply before the second-stage offering have better performance in the long-run by using both buy-and-hold measures. The average market-adjusted-BHAR and characteristic-adjusted-BHAR for our sample are -6.8% and 0.22% for introductions with security lending supply before the second-stage offering, higher than that for introductions without security lending supply (i.e., -11.8% and -15.3%). The difference of characteristic-adjusted-BHAR is significant at 10% level. Results remain similar if we employ the calendar-time portfolio method. The difference of annualized four-factor alpha between the short-sale constrained and unconstrained introduction portfolios is -2.23%, significant at 5% level.
Overall, evidence from univariate tests provides support for our conjectures. The relaxation of short-sale constraints before the second-stage offering is associated with lower initial return and better long-run performance of IPOs.
Initial returns
In this session, we use multivariate analysis to study whether relaxing short-sale constraints reduces the initial return of two-stage IPO firms. We start with ordinary least squares (OLS) approach. In particular, we estimate the following reduced-form regression:
Control variables include several factors that are known to predict IPO initial returns (Derrien and Kecskés, 2007) . Among these factors, operating performance at offering is a dummy variable that equals to one if a firm has positive sales, operating income, and net income on the secondstage offering day, and zero otherwise. It proxies for the quality of issuers. Proceeds is the natural log of proceeds (measured in million pounds) on the second-stage offering day. Market return at offering is the market index return over the previous three months ending the day before the second-stage offering day. It proxies for the market condition. Industry return at offering and Industry volatility at offering are the industry return during the 30 days before the second-stage offering and its associated standard deviation. These two variables proxy for the industry performance at the second-stage offering.
Since heterogeneous beliefs could also contribute to the IPO initial price run-up and long-run underperformance (Miller, 1977) , we further employ press coverage and relative quoted spread as additional control variables. We define press coverage as the natural log of one plus the number of press releases in Factiva from the first-stage introduction to the announcement day of the second-stage offering day. If press coverage captures the level of information production (Derrien and Kecskés, 2007) , higher press coverage should be associated with smaller opinion dispersion at offering. Further, the previous literature shows that heterogeneous beliefs among investors would create bid-ask spread, which in turn could proxy for opinion dispersion (Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, and Yan, 2001; Handa, Schwartz, and, Tiwari, 2003) . We define relative quoted spread as the difference between the bid and ask prices on the second-stage offering day, divided by the mean of bid and ask prices.
Finally, we control for years between stages, which is the number of years between the firststage introduction and second-stage offering. We also include year dummy variables to account for the time-variation in initial return. We expect the security lending supply to be negatively correlated with the initial return. (1) and (2) use initial return as the dependent variable while Columns (3) and (4) use market-adjusted initial return as the dependent variable. We find that, using both dependent variables, security lending supply is negatively associated with the initial return. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in security lending supply is associated with a 4.9% decrease in the initial price run-up in both Columns (2) and (4). Collectively, results in Table 4 support our first hypothesis that the security lending supply before the IPO offering day has a negative effect on the initial return.
To account for the potential endogeneity problem, we employ the two-stage ordinary least square (2SLS) estimation using number of brokers at offering and turnover at listing as instrumental variables for the security lending supply. We define number of brokers at offering as the natural log of one plus the average number of securities borrowing and lending brokers for that stock during the 30 days prior to the second-stage offering day , and turnover at listing as the mean of daily turnover in the first month following the first-stage introduction.
The existing literature suggests that stock liquidity is positively correlated with the security lending supply (e.g., D' Avolio, 2002; Jones and Lamont, 2002) . Further, stocks with more brokers in the securities borrowing and lending market are more likely to have greater security lending supply, hence satisfying the relevance criterion. Since the average duration between the first-stage introduction and second-stage offering is 1.3 years, turnover at listing is unlikely to directly affect the second-stage initial return and subsequent long-run performance. Similarly, the number of brokers in the securities borrowing and lending market has no direct effect on the stock performance, therefore satisfying the exclusion criterion. Moreover, we perform the following two tests to validate our choice of instrumental variables: (i) a Kleibergen-Paap (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006 ) relevance test to ensure high correlations between instrumental variables and security lending supply, and (ii) a Hansen's J over-identification test to examine the exogeneity of the instrumental variables. Test results suggest that both instrumental variables are relevant and exogenous.
As we have a relative small sample of 102 firms, we also report the results of the limited information maximum likelihood estimation (i.e., LIML) to address the finite-sample bias (Anderson and Rubin, 1949; 1950). 7 Column (1) of Table 5 reports the instrumental variable estimation results. We find that both number of brokers at offering and turnover at listing are positively associated with the security lending supply. This finding suggests that introduction firms are likely to have larger security lending supply if they are more liquid at the first-stage introduction or have more securities borrowing and lending brokers at the second-stage offering.
Columns (2) and (4) use the 2SLS approach, while Columns (3) and (5) implement LIML approach. Consistent with our expectation, we find that relaxing short-sale constraints could significantly reduce the initial return. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase of security lending supply is associated with a 12.6% decrease of initial return with the 2SLS 7 According to Stock and Yogo (2005) , the LIML approach provides the same asymptotic distribution as 2SLS but reduces finite-sample bias. The LIML approach is also claimed to be more resistant to weak instruments problems. approach (Column (2) of Table 5 ). Results remain robust if we use the LIML approach or use the market-adjusted initial return as the dependent variable. Further, consistent with Derrien and
Kecskés (2007), we also find that issuers are more likely to have higher initial returns if the market return is high or firm operational performance is bad.
Pricing discount
Findings in Section 5.2 indicate that relaxing short-sale constraints could be associated with lower initial return. However, we still need to disentangle the market overpricing effect from the pricing discount effect (i.e., underwriters intentionally underprice IPOs during periods of uncertainty and information asymmetry) (Rock, 1986 and Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) .
Specifically, Rock (1986) finds that to ensure uninformed investors would buy the issuance, underwriters would intentionally offer pricing discounts for IPOs.
Therefore, an alternative interpretation of our previous finding could be that the low initial return for two-stage IPOs with higher security lending supply simply reflects less pricing discount from underwriters. In this section we examine this alternative interpretation by employing multivariate tests. If introductions with higher security lending supply experience less pricing discounts, we would expect the security lending supply or the dummy variable of short-sale unconstrained firms to be negatively correlated with the pricing discount. Table 6 reports the effects of the short-sale constraints on the pricing discount. In particular, short-sale unconstrained firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the two-stage IPO firm has positive security lending supply before the second-stage offering, and zero otherwise. Control variables include proceeds, market return at announcement, market level at announcement, operating performance at announcement, capitalization at announcement, years between listing and announcement, press coverage, industry return at announcement and industry volatility at announcement. The announcement day of the second-stage offering is defined as the earliest date of news release about the second-stage offering we find in Factiva.
Consistent with our prediction, we find no significant relation between pricing discount and short-sale constraints. In Columns (3) and (4) we examine the effect of security lending supply on pricing discount. Again we do not find any significant relation between security lending supply and pricing discount. Therefore, pricing discount does not explain our results. 8
Long-run performance
Our second hypothesis posits that introductions with higher security lending supply before the second-stage offering would experience better long-run performance. Following Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), we estimate IPO long-run performance using a three-year horizon. Specifically, the holding period starts from 6 trading days after the second-stage offering day and lasts for 756 days.
Since the previous literature shows that IPO long-run performance is sensitive to methodologies (e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997; Brav and Gompers, 1997), we use different approaches to ensure the robustness of our results.
First, we estimate market-adjusted-BHAR using the HGSC Index. Derrien and Kecskés (2007) show that HGSC Index is a standard index for small-cap firms in the U.K. As IPOs are normally small-cap at the offering, the index fits characteristics of issuers. Next, motivated by Brav and Gompers (1997) who show that the long-run IPO underperformance could be largely explained by size and book-to-market effects, we estimate characteristic-adjusted-BHAR using size and bookto-market matched firms. Matching firms are non-IPO stocks which have at least five years of listing history but do not have follow-on equity issuance five years before the matching date.
If the best-matching firm is delisted during our three-year estimation window, we use the secondbest matching firm instead. Specifically, the three-year long-run performance is calculated as follows:
)] × 100,
where ri,t is the return of stock i on day t; T equals to offering date + 762 trading days; rm,t is the corresponding benchmark return (i.e., market index or matching firm return) on day t. Both market-adjusted-BHAR and characteristic-adjusted-BHAR are annualized after estimation. 9 To further ensure the robustness of our results, we use a third method to measure the long-run performance, i.e., the Carhart (1997) four-factor model:
where rf,t is the risk free rate on day t; Rm,t-Rf,t is the excess market portfolio return on day t; SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt stand for the size, value and momentum factors on day t. 10 The daily excess return αi is annualized to simplify the interpretation of following regression coefficients. 9 Among the 102 introductions, no firm is delisted within three years after the second-stage offering. Therefore, our results do not have survival bias. However, three firms completed the second-stage offering later than October 2011 and therefore have a trading history of less than three years. To avoid selection bias, we keep these stocks and use the last day of our sample, 31st October 2014, as the ending day of their holding period. Our results remain similar if we exclude these three stocks. 10 We use the size, value and momentum factors constructed for the U.K. market by Gregory, Tharyan, and Christidis (2013). Table 7 presents the simple OLS regression results. We find that the security lending supply has significantly positive influences using all the measurements of IPO long-run performance. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in security lending supply is associated with a 10.4% (19.2%) increase in market-adjusted-BHAR (characteristic-adjusted-BHAR). Further, for the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha, a one standard deviation increase in security lending supply is associated with an abnormal return of 11.9%. These results remain robust after the inclusion of additional control variables. In terms of opinion dispersion, we find that the coefficient estimates of press coverage and relative quoted spread are insignificant in all columns. Table 8 presents the estimation results by using the 2SLS and LIML approaches. In Column
(1), we find that the first-stage regression result is similar to the result in the initial return analysis.
Stocks with greater number of brokers at offering and higher turnover at the first-stage introduction are more likely to have more security lending supply. The f-statistic is 14.38 for all the models.
Further, the Hansen-J statistics suggest that none of our models rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments. Therefore, our instrumental variables are valid in all long-run performance models.
Columns (2) to (7) of Table 7 present the second-stage regression results. Consistent with our expectation, we find that security lending supply is positively correlated with IPO long-run performance by using all the three long-run performance measures. Specifically, Columns (2) and (3) report effects of security lending supply on market-adjusted-BHAR. In economic terms, with the 2SLS approach, a one standard deviation increase in security lending supply is associated with a 16.0% increase in market-adjusted-BHAR. Results are similar if we use characteristic-adjusted-BHAR or the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha as long-run performance measure. Further, our findings remain robust with the LIML approach, which suggests that our estimations do not suffer small-sample bias.
Overall, these findings indicate that relaxing short-sale constraints improves IPO long-run performance.
Alternative explanations
In this section, we check the robustness of our results. One alternative explanation of our main results could be that the security lending supply provides liquidity to the market on the secondstage offering day and therefore reduces the illiquidity premium of the new issuance. Amihud (2002) shows that market illiquidity is positively associated with the stock excess return, and this effect is stronger in smaller stocks. If this is the case, then we should observe that the security lending supply promotes the liquidity of introductions on the second-stage offering day. Table 9 reports our OLS estimation results for this alternative explanation. We use the bid-ask spread and turnover on the second-stage issuance day as two measurements of the IPO liquidity.
In Columns (1) and (3), we find that there is no significant difference between the liquidity for short-sale constrained and unconstrained introductions on the second-stage offering day. In
Columns (2) and (4), the coefficients of security lending supply are statistically insignificant, indicating that short-sale constraints do not have significant influence on IPO liquidity on the second-stage offering day. Therefore, liquidity premium does not explain our results.
Conclusion
This study investigates the effects of relaxing short-sale constraints on the first-day IPO return and subsequent long-run performance by using a set of two-stage IPOs, named as introductions.
In an introduction, public listing and initial share offering are separated into two stages. This feature enables the security lending supply to exist before the second-stage offering, leaving us a natural design to directly examine the effects of relaxing short-sale constraints on IPO-related puzzles. We find that IPOs with higher security lending supply before offering experience less initial price run-up and better long-run performance.
Our findings provide new evidence in the debate on the theoretical model developed in Miller (1977) which posits that short-sale constraints could lead to the IPO initial price run-up. In our sample, the short-sale unconstrained IPOs have 12.9% of outstanding shares available for borrowing before the second-stage offering day. We find that two-stage IPOs with higher security lending supply experience less initial price run-up and better long-run performance than their counterparts. Our findings support the assumption that short-sale constraints could be associated with the IPO initial price run-up and subsequent long-run underperformance (Miller 1977; Derrien 2005; Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh, 2006) .
Our findings also demonstrate that short selling could improve pricing efficiency (Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2010; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Bohemer and Wu, 2013) . We find that relaxing short-sale constraints improves the IPO pricing efficiency on the offering day. This evidence contributes to the short selling literature, and further supports the positive role of short selling in the financial market.
Our findings have important implications for market designers and practitioners. By extending the findings in Derrien and Kecskés (2007), we further show that the two-stage IPO strategy could be an effective way for firms to go public. Investors may consider going public with this strategy to enjoy possible benefits from relaxed short-sale constraints. (1) and (2) report the year distribution for introductions at the first-stage introduction; Columns (3) and (4) report the year distribution for introductions at the second-stage offering.
First-stage listing Second-stage offering (2) to the 78 two-stage introductions without security lending supply before the second-stage offering, and
Column (3) to the 24 introductions with security lending supply before the second-stage offering. Column (4) reports the t-statistics for tests of mean difference. Security lending supply is the average total lendable shares of each two-stage introduction over one week ending issuing day, divide by corresponding total shares outstanding. Number of brokers at offering is defined as the natural log of one plus the average number of securities borrowing and lending brokers for that stock during the 30 days prior to the secondstage offering day. Turnover at listing is the mean value of daily turnover over the first-stage introduction month. Proceeds is the nature log of the second-stage issuance proceeds measured in million pounds. Capitalization at offering is the nature log of market capitalization at second-stage offering measured in million pounds. Press coverage is the natural log of one plus the number of press releases in Factiva from the first-stage introduction to the announcement day of the second-stage offering day. Relative quoted spread is the difference between offering day bid and ask price, divide by the mean of bid and ask price.
Year between stages is the number of years between the first-stage introduction and second-stage offering.
Pricing discount is defined as the market price on the day before the second-stage offering announcement day, divided by the offering price, minus one.
(1) (1) pertains to our full sample, 102 two-stage introductions, Column (2) to the 78 two-stage introductions without security lending supply before the second-stage offering, and Column (3) to the 24 introductions with security lending supply before the second-stage offering. Column (4) reports the t-statistics for tests of mean difference. Initial return is the difference between the offering price and the second-stage offering day closing price, divide by the offering price. Market-adjusted initial return is the raw initial return minus offering day market index return. Market-adjusted-BHAR is the annualized adjusted three year buy-andhold abnormal return using market index as the benchmark. Characteristic-adjusted-BHAR is the annualized adjusted three year buy-and-hold abnormal return using size and book-to-market ratio matched firm with at least five years of LSE listing and no follow-on equity issues in the prior five years as the benchmark. Four-factor-alpha is annualized excess return of equal-weight calendar-time portfolio, measured as the intercept of daily return regressions by using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model as the benchmark.
(1) Table 5 Initial return and security lending supply before IPOs -IV estimations This table presents the difference in initial returns between two-stage introductions with short-sale constraint and without short-sale constraint. The sample comprises 102 U.K. two-stage firms that complete their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. We use two-stage ordinary least squares regressions (2SLS) to control for endogeneity problem, and also report limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation results for robustness. Column (1) reports the first-stage regression results. Exogenous instrumental variables are discussed in Section 5. Columns (2) to (5) report the second-stage regression results. . All the variables are as defined in Tables 2 and 3 . All columns include offering year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry and are presented below each coefficient estimate in parentheses. ***indicates significance at the 1% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level, and *indicates significance at the 10% level.
(1) Table 6 Pricing discount and security lending supply before IPOs -OLS estimations This table presents the difference in raw initial returns between two-stage introductions with short-sale constraint and without short-sale constraint. The sample comprises 102 U.K. two-stage IPO firms that complete their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions as our estimation method. Pricing discount is defined as the market price on the day before the second-stage offering announcement day, divided by the offering price, minus one. Shortsale unconstrained firm is a dummy variable that equals one if the two-stage IPO firm is short-sale unconstrained, and zero otherwise. Other variables are as defined in Tables 2 and 3 . All columns include offering year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry and are presented below each coefficient estimate in parentheses. ***indicates significance at the 1% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level, and *indicates significance at the 10% level.
(1)
(2) Table 8 Long-run performance and security lending supply before IPOs -IV estimations This table presents the difference in long-run returns between two-stage introductions with short-sale constraint and without short-sale constraint. The sample comprises 102 U.K. two-stage firms that complete their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. We use two-stage ordinary least squares regressions (2SLS) to control for endogeneity problem, and also report limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation results for robustness. Column (1) reports the first-stage regression results. Exogenous instrumental variables are discussed in Section 5. Columns (2) to (5) report the second-stage regression results. All the variables are as defined in Tables 2, 3 and 7. All columns include offering year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry and are presented below each coefficient estimate in parentheses. ***indicates significance at the 1% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level, and *indicates significance at the 10% level.
(1) Hansen's J over-identification test (p-value) 0.37 Table 9 Stock liquidity and security lending supply before IPOs This table presents the difference in offering day liquidity between two-stage introductions with short-sale constraint and without short-sale constraint. The sample comprises 102 U.K. two-stage IPO firms that complete their second-stage offering between January 2002 and December 2013. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions as our estimation method. Bid-ask spread is the bid-ask spread on the secondstage offering day, measured in percentage. Turnover is calculated as trading volume divide by shares outstanding on the second-stage offering day. Other variables are as defined in Tables 2 and 3 . All columns include offering year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by industry and are presented below each coefficient estimate in parentheses. ***indicates significance at the 1% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level, and *indicates significance at the 10% level.
(2) 
